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OPINION
McKee, Circuit Judge
JaJuan Hamilton appeals the 63-month sentence that was imposed following his
guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). His primary contention is that the district court improperly lengthened his term
of imprisonment to increase his chances of getting into rehabilitative programs while in
custody.1 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with that contention and will
therefore remand for resentencing.2
I.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the factual or procedural background except to the extent that may be
helpful to our brief discussion.
The following exchange occurred at sentencing as the district court diligently and
thoroughly explained her consideration of the history and characteristics of the defendant,
the nature and circumstances of the offense of conviction, and the other sentencing
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He also contends that the court unreasonably failed to grant a downward variance
because the facts of his offense were not “typical” for the crime of felon-in-possession. Given
the sentencing court’s meticulous consideration of the various factors relevant to sentencing, see
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), that contention can be dismissed without discussion.
2

“We review criminal sentences for a ‘violation of the law’ [] which includes (i) matters
of statutory interpretation over which we have plenary review [], as well as (ii) questions about
reasonableness, []” United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2007). Hamilton
objected at sentencing, thus preserving these issues for appeal.
2

factors contained in § 3553(a):
THE COURT: The Court notes too that you’re requesting that you be
recommended for some training, electric and plumbing along those lines, so
you can work when you come out?
MR. HAMILTON: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Is there any other kind of vocational training that - - if they
don’t have those, would you want to be eligible for whatever other class?
MR. HAMILTON: I want to learn as much as I can.
THE COURT: Okay. I’ll make it broader than that. I am worried about
the violence in your background.
MR. HAMILTON: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: I mean, from the time you were 14 years old you were in
trouble.
MR. HAMILTON: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: The trouble that you get into frequently did involve guns.
There were guns around for several of the instances.
MR. HAMILTON: This is the second incident.
THE COURT: The alcohol seems to be a problem for you as well.
MR. HAMILTON: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Drinking and that type of thing, I think that exacerbates the
situation for you because whatever emotional problems you have are
problematic as well.
I’m going to recommend that you volunteer for what I call the 500hour Residential Program. It’s mainly for people who have abuse problems,
drug and alcohol, trying to help them to control the triggers in their life that
cause them to act in inappropriate manners.
***
I think there could be some programs that might be beneficial for
you along those lines. I’m not sure that you’ll qualify for time off with a
500-hour program because of the violence. It’s just something you would
have to do because you want to do it. It’s going to help you when you come
out.
***
Honestly, if you come out again and you repeat and you come back
into either the state or the federal system, the sentence is just going to get
longer and longer because of your criminal record and your background.
It’s a great tragedy. It’s a tragedy for your family. It’s a tragedy for
you. So I feel that when I’m sentencing you, I need to give you a longer
sentence rather than a short sentence because I think you really need to
3

get the training.
App. 67-70. (emphasis added).
The judge then sentenced Hamilton to 63 months, to run concurrently with the
remainder of Hamilton’s state sentence, a term of supervised release of three years, and a
$100 special assessment. The court then explained each of the sentencing factors she had
considered in great detail. After the court explained all of the reasons for the sentence,
defense counsel objected “to the Court’s statement that a lengthy sentence is necessary to
provide [Hamilton] with . . . needed treatment and to take advantage of the programs.”
App. 83. Counsel pointed out that there was no evidence in the record regarding the time
necessary to get into any particular program - or evidence that Hamilton could or would
utilize the programs. Id. The court’s response included the following:
My understanding is that he – if you do the 500-hour, you have to
have a term of imprisonment generally at least two to three years in length
because by the time you get into the system and you want to qualify for it,
there’s a waiting list that you have to have a significant sentence in order to
qualify for that.
For training programs, there may also be some waiting lists. I can’t
assure that he will not be sitting for a few years before he gets the training.
On the other hand, I think with that type of sentence, the likelihood
that he will be able to participate in some program is greater. I’m not
saying that anything is an assurance because I have no control over what
happens in the Bureau of Prisons.
I think a lengthy sentence within the guideline range is appropriate
because of the history of violence, and I want to give him the maximum
opportunity to obtain treatment in the system and also the training. If he
doesn’t take advantage of it or they can’t provide it as timely, there’s not
much that this Court can do.
I think that’s a factor I have to look at in terms of determining the
sentencing, the appropriate sentence; and given the individual’s background
4

and taking all of the other factors into account, while I recognize that I can’t
give 100-percent assurances that he be able to be certified for a journeyman
or reach some level of certification in a trade, at least he will have a
sufficient length of time to attempt to take advantage of those programs and
to receive some credible training so that when he comes out he can look for
gainful employment and hopefully won’t have to go into a training program
where he may not have an income which could lead back to the problems
that he has today.
Nothing here can be assured; but on balance I think when I look at
all of the factors, I think it is an appropriate sentence.
App. 83-85. Defense counsel continued to object based upon the uncertainty that
Hamilton would receive the anticipated rehabilitative treatment while in custody, and the
AUSA responded as follows:
MS. HOUGHTON: If I may respond to that. Your Honor has made it very
clear that was one factor; but Your Honor clearly outlined other factors
here, and that is the nature of this offense wherein he had a loaded weapon
and endangered an officer by refusal to obey the officer’s instruction as a
felon.
App. 86.
II.
At the outset, we note that it is impossible to review the entire sentencing
transcript without being impressed with the careful and individualized manner in which
the district court attempted to fashion an appropriate sentence for Hamilton that would
satisfy each and every sentencing consideration, including the sometimes opposing
objectives of punishment and deterrence on the one hand and rehabilitation and the needs
of the defendant on the other. Nevertheless, it is clear from our reading of the sentencing
transcript that the court increased the term of imprisonment imposed in order to increase
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Hamilton’s chances of accessing rehabilitative programs while incarcerated. The court’s
intentions in doing so are nothing short of laudatory. Nevertheless, despite the court’s
good intentions, after the sentence was imposed we decided United States v. Watson, 482
F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2007), and United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007).
There we held that “a court can not . . . impose or lengthen a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of providing correction and rehabilitation.” Watson, 482 F.3d at 275 (emphasis
in original).
Although the government now argues vociferously that the court did not increase
Hamilton’s term of imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes, we see no reason why we
should ignore the court’s own declaration to the contrary. As we noted above, the judge
explicitly stated that “I need to give you a longer sentence rather than a short sentence
because I think you really need to get the training.” She also stated, “I think the longer
term of imprisonment to provide you with some educational training in the 500-hour
program will be of benefit.” (App. 80) Moreover, as we have also just noted, in response
to defense counsel’s objection, the AUSA argued: “Your Honor has made it very clear
that was one factor . . . .” Of course, neither the court nor the AUSA had the benefit of
Watson or Manzella at the sentencing. However, that can not be said now and the
government nevertheless insists on arguing that the sentencing judge either did not say
what she meant, or that she did not mean to say what she clearly said, and what the AUSA
at sentencing understood her to say. Accordingly, we are less than sympathetic to the
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adversarial zeal that appears to be driving the government’s objection to a remand, and
we are convinced that a fair reading of the sentencing proceedings in view of Manzella
and Watson require the remand we will order.
III.
For the reasons set forth herein, we will remand for the district court for
resentencing consistent with this opinion. At resentencing, the the district court can
impose an appropriate sentence pursuant to the factors set forth in § 3553(a) without
increasing any sentence of imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes. In doing so, we
pause to note that we appreciate that the cases that dictate this result were decided after
the court imposed this sentence and we reiterate our belief that the manner in which the
court went about determining this sentence and the court’s explanation of it were
otherwise exemplary.
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